OTS-based SCADA Control Command Sequential Logic Authentication Scheme

Abstract

Supervisory Control and Data Acquisition systems are widely used in the continuous control and monitoring of physical processing processes of modern critical infrastructures. Attackers can tamper with the control center's sequential logic control messages and send wrong sequential logic control commands to remote terminal units (RTUs) or intelligent electronic devices (IEDs), causing confusion in the controller and disrupting the physical processing process of the SCADA system. resulting in economic losses, environmental disasters, and even casualties. How to secure the transmission of sequential logic of SCADA system control commands is one of the key issues in the security operation of industrial control systems. This paper proposes a linkable signature scheme based on the one-time signature to secure the sequential logic and secure transmission of legal industrial control commands. The formal analysis proves that the linkable scheme can effectively resist counterfeiting, forgery, denial, replay attacks and selective forwarding attacks.